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Abstract 29 
Live vaccination against polio has effectively prevented outbreaks in most developed 30 
countries for more than 40 years, and there remain only a few countries where 31 
outbreaks of poliomyelitis by the wild strain still threaten the community. It is 32 
expected that worldwide eradication will be eventually achieved through careful 33 
surveillance and a well-managed immunization program. The present paper argues, 34 
however, that based on a simple stochastic model the risk of outbreak by a vaccine-35 
derived strain after the cessation of vaccination is quite high, even if many years have 36 
passed since the last confirmed case. As vaccinated hosts are natural reservoirs for 37 
virulent poliovirus, the source of the risk is the vaccination itself, employed to prevent 38 
the outbreaks. The crisis after stopping vaccination will emerge when the following 39 
two conditions are met: the susceptible host density exceeds the threshold for 40 
epidemics and the vaccinated host density remains large enough to ensure the 41 
occurrence of virulent mutants in the population. Our estimates for transmission, 42 
recovery, and mutation rates, show that the probability of an outbreak of vaccine-43 
derived virulent viruses easily exceeds 90%. Moreover, if a small fraction of hosts 44 
have a longer infectious period, as observed in individuals with innate 45 
immunodeficiency, the risk of an outbreak rises significantly. Under such conditions, 46 
successful global eradication of polio is restricted to a certain range of parameters 47 
even if inactive polio vaccine (IPV) is extensively used after the termination of live 48 
vaccination. 49 
 50 
1. Introduction 51 
The World Health Organization (WHO) has a target to interrupt wild poliovirus 52 
transmission throughout the world by 2013 (WHO, 2010). The number of patients 53 
with poliomyelitis by wild type poliovirus infection has decreased drastically due to a 54 
program using live oral polio vaccine (OPV). Immunity by OPV is defensible against 55 
excreted viruses because the major antigenic sites on the viral genome are relatively 56 
conserved between serotypes during replication (Minor, 1992). However, nucleotide 57 
substitutions responsible for increased neurovirulence frequently occur during 58 
replication in the human gut (Poyry et al., 1988; Dunn et al., 1990; Abraham et al., 59 
1993; Kew et al., 1998; Matsuura et al., 2000; Shulman et al., 2000). It has been 60 
reported since the 1960's that the vaccine-derived strain excreted from humans can 61 
exhibit pathogenicity (Benyesh-Melnick et al., 1967; Marker Test Subcommittee. The 62 
Japan Live Poliovaccine Research Commission, 1967). This suggests the possibility 63 
that vaccine-derived viruses could cause a poliomyelitis outbreak in a susceptible 64 
population after the cessation of an OPV program (Wood et al., 2000). The objective 65 
of this study was to estimate the risk of outbreak of vaccine-derived strains after 66 
stopping OPV.  While the number of attenuated virus carriers, the source of 67 
neurovirulent viruses, would decline after the discontinuation of OPV, the number of 68 
susceptible hosts would increase and may finally exceed the threshold for an outbreak. 69 
Therefore, successful eradication depends on which of these processes is faster. We 70 
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calculated the probability of successful global eradication, that is, the probability that 71 
the last carrier will be recovered before the population could experience an outbreak.  72 
 73 
It will be shown below that the mean excretion period from an infected individual is 74 
one of the key factors that determine whether or not eradication fails. Except for 75 
immunodeficient individuals, virus is excreted from humans for approximately 1-3 76 
months after OPV administration to a susceptible host (Alexander et al., 1997). 77 
Excreted viruses are often virulent. For example, Yoshida et al. showed that type 3 78 
vaccine-derived polioviruses isolated from an environment in Japan had high 79 
neurovirulence (Yoshida et al., 2000). These strains were isolated from river or 80 
sewage waters approximately 3 months after routine OPV administration, showing 81 
that vaccine-derived strains could circulate in the human community. Other studies 82 
showed silent circulation of vaccine-derived strains occurred in the human 83 
community (Zdrazilek et al., 1982; Miyamura et al., 1992). 84 
 85 
To avoid risks such as contact infection or vaccine-associated paralysis (VAP), 86 
inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) has been used in several countries (Murdin et al., 87 
1996). The USA switched its immunization strategy from OPV to IPV in 2000 88 
(American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Infectious Diseases, 1999). As IPV 89 
immunized hosts can be infected by polioviruses and excrete infectious virus, IPV is 90 
less effective than OPV in preventing infection, though numbers of excreted viruses 91 
are greatly reduced (Fine and Carneiro, 1999). Our study also investigated whether 92 
switching to IPV after the cessation of OPV effectively reduced outbreak risk. 93 
 94 
The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) reported a poliomyelitis outbreak by 95 
a type 1 vaccine-derived strain in Haiti and the Dominican Republic in July 2000 96 
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2000). In the Latin American region, 97 
poliomyelitis caused by a wild strain was last reported in Peru in 1991, and 98 
eradication of poliomyelitis was declared in 1994. The recent outbreak in Haiti and 99 
the Dominican Republic could be ascribed to the decreased rate of OPV coverage and 100 
the spread of a neurovirulent vaccine-derived strain.  101 
 102 
The polio eradication program plans to stop administering OPV after disappearance of 103 
the wild strain. If vaccine-derived strains remain when herd immunity falls below the 104 
epidemic threshold, outbreak by these strains could occur. In this paper, we study the 105 
probability of disease re-emergence caused by a vaccine-derived strain using a simple 106 
mathematical model. Epidemiological and genetic parameters, such as transmission 107 
rate, mean excretion period, mutation rate from attenuated to neurovirulent strains, are 108 
varied around estimated values (Gelfand et al., 1959; Benyesh-Melnick et al., 1967; 109 
Dunn et al., 1990; Fine and Carneiro, 1999), and dependence on the probability of 110 
eradication detailed. In assessing the risk we assumed the following:  111 
1. That the excretion period of vaccine-derived neurovirulent viruses can be longer 112 
than  that of the attenuated viruses used in live immunization. Likewise, the 113 
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transmission rates of vaccine-derived strain can be greater than that of the 114 
attenuated strain. When hosts recover from infection by either viral strain, the 115 
degree of immunity is as effective as that raised by OPV immunization.  116 
2. That infection by either the vaccine-derived or attenuated poliovirus can occur in 117 
IPV-immunized hosts. However, the number of secondary transmissions from a 118 
previously IPV-immunized host is smaller than that from a susceptible host, and 119 
the mean excretion period is shorter in an IPV-immunized host than in a 120 
susceptible host. 121 
3. That when re-infection occurs in an individual immunized by OPV, excretion 122 
from the re-infection is ignored because the amount of virus excretion is 123 
negligibly small (Abraham et al., 1993). 124 
4. That antigenic drift does not occur.  The focus of the study is on the risk of 125 
outbreak by a neurovirulent vaccine-derived strain with unchanged antigenic 126 
properties.  127 
5. That a constant fraction (e.g. 70%) of hosts is efficiently immunized 128 
(seroconverted) before OPV is stopped, and that the population at that time is in 129 
endemic equilibrium under constant OPV coverage. 130 
 131 
We first examine the risk of outbreak after OPV cessation (in the absence of an 132 
alternate program); second, we evaluate the effect of host heterogeneity on excretion 133 
duration; and third, we examine outbreak risk where extensive IPV-immunization 134 
follows OPV cessation. 135 
 136 
Mathematical modeling is a powerful tool in the understanding of epidemiological 137 
dynamics (Anderson and May, 1991). Previous models of polio eradication have 138 
considered neither the re-infection by vaccine-derived strains of IPV-immunized hosts 139 
nor mutation giving rise to neurovirulent strains (Eichner and Hadeler, 1995; Eichner 140 
and Dietz, 1996). Our model allows for the mutation of attenuated strains to virulent 141 
strains while replicating in the human gut (Poyry et al., 1988; Dunn et al., 1990; 142 
Abraham et al., 1993; Kew et al., 1998; Matsuura et al., 2000; Shulman et al., 2000), 143 
and also allows both strains to infect IPV-immunized hosts. The probability for the 144 
success of global eradication is then calculated based on the stochastic model of 145 
epidemiological dynamics.  146 
 147 
2. Material and Methods 148 
We attempted to determine the risk of virulent poliovirus outbreaks after stopping live 149 
vaccination. Time t  0   represents the point at which immunization by live-150 
poliovirus vaccine (OPV) is stopped. With a sufficiently high rate of immunization, 151 
the great majority of the population at time t  0  would be OPV-immunized hosts, 152 
which neither the attenuated (Sabin) nor virulent strain could infect. We first 153 
examined the risk where no alternative program followed OPV cessation. The effect 154 
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of extensive administration of inactive vaccine (IPV) following OPV discontinuation 155 
will be discussed later. 156 
 157 
2.1. Deterministic epidemiological dynamics 158 
The number of carriers of attenuated virus would decline after the end of a live 159 
vaccination program. Poliovirus is considered to have been eradicated when the last 160 
carrier had recovered. However, while the number of carriers declines, the number of 161 
hosts immunized by the live vaccine declines also. When the number of susceptible 162 
hosts exceeds a certain threshold, the way is opened for the spread of a virulent 163 
poliovirus. Thus, the risk of outbreak critically depends on the speed at which carrier 164 
numbers, as the source of virulent mutant virus, decrease and the speed at which 165 
susceptible hosts increase. Therefore, we need to keep track of the changes over time 166 
of the following demographic variables: the fraction of susceptible hosts ( x ), hosts 167 
infected with or carrying attenuated virus ( y ), virulent-virus infected hosts ( v ), and 168 
OPV-immunized hosts not carrying virus ( z ), with x  y  v z 1. The population 169 
size K  is kept constant over time. A virulent virus strain can emerge through 170 
mutation in attenuated virus carriers. The probability of successful eradication, or 171 
conversely, the probability of an outbreak by a virulent virus, can be evaluated by 172 
constructing a stochastic process for the change in the number of infected hosts. To 173 
construct the stochastic process, we first derive the corresponding deterministic 174 
dynamics. 175 
 176 
2.1.1. Deterministic dynamics before the cessation of OPV 177 
Under the immunization of oral polio vaccine to newborns the dynamics for x , y  178 
and v  are 179 
 dx / dt  (
a
y 
v
v)x uxu(1 p),  (1a) 180 
 dy / dt  
a
xy  (u
a
)y  y up, (1b) 181 
 dv / dt  
v
xv  (u
v
)v  y, (1c) 182 
 dz / dt  
a
y 
v
v uz, (1d)  183 
where t  denotes the time variable in units of weeks, p is the immunization fraction 184 
to newborns (the fraction to be immunized times the seroconversion rate), u  is the 185 
natural mortality of the host, 
a
 and 
v
 are the transmission rates of attenuated and 186 
virulent virus, respectively, 1/ 
a
 and 1/ 
v
 are the mean durations of attenuated and 187 
virulent virus infection, respectively, and   is the mutation rate from attenuated to 188 
virulent virus (Fig 1). The number of births and deaths are balanced so that the total 189 
population is kept constant ( K , and we focus on the changes in the fraction of each 190 
class), by which we can omit Eq. (1d) from the analysis. If   0 , the condition for 191 
virulent or wild polio virus being wiped out from the population is that  192 
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 p  p
c
 1 1
R
v
  1 RaRv , (2) 193 
where R
v
 
v
/ (u
v
)  and R
a
 
a
/ (u
a
)  are the basic reproductive ratios of 194 
virulent and attenuated viruses (see, for example, Nowak and May, 2000). The 195 
threshold immunization fraction necessary for the eradication of virulent viruses is 196 
lower than that without circulation of attenuated viruses ( p
c
11/ R
v
). Thus silent 197 
circulation of attenuated virus can significantly increase the efficiency of vaccination. 198 
With nonzero mutation rate   0 , both the attenuated and the virulent virus are 199 
maintained in the population: 200 
 yˆ  u(u
a
)
p
(1 R
a
xˆ)   ,  (3a) 201 
  (3b) 202 
where    / (u
a
)  and xˆ  is a positive root of 203 
 R
a
R
v
xˆ3  (R
a
 R
v
 R
a
R
v
 R
v
)xˆ2 204 
 
 (1 ) R
a
 (1 p )R
v
  xˆ  (1 p)(1 )  0. (3c) 205 
Figure 2 shows how the equilibrium numbers defined above depend on the 206 
immunization fraction p  and the mutation rate  , together with the mean number of 207 
virulent virus infections per week, 
v
xˆvˆ , under immunization.  208 
 209 
As we will see later, the success or failure of global eradication after the cessation of 210 
OPV critically depends on the equilibrium densities of susceptible, attenuated virus 211 
infected, and virulent virus infected hosts at the time of stopping OPV illustrated 212 
above. Their parameter dependences are best described if there was no significant 213 
difference in transmission rates and recovery rates between attenuated and virulent 214 
polio strains, such that we can assume   
a
 
v
, and   
a
 
v
. This is an 215 
important special case that is also partly supported from the data (see later). If this is 216 
the case, the dynamics (1) could be described by only two variables: x  (the fraction 217 
of susceptible hosts) and w  y v  (the fraction of hosts infected by either attenuated 218 
or virulent virus). The epidemiological dynamics (1) under OPV immunization are 219 
then 220 
 dx / dt  xwuxu(1 p),   221 
 dw / dt  xw (u )wup.  (4) 222 
from which the equilibrium fractions xˆ  and wˆ  are obtained: 223 
 xˆ  R0 1 (R0 1)2  4 pR0  / 2R0 ,  224 
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wˆ  u / (u ) (1 xˆ),  (5) 225 
where R0   / (u )  is the basic reproductive ratio of both strains. If R0  is 226 
sufficiently large ( R0 1), 227 
 xˆ  1 p
R0
,  228 
 yˆ  u
u pp  , (6) 229 
 vˆ  u
u p  ,  230 
which describe well how the equilibrium densities change with the immunization 231 
fraction p and mutation rate   (u )   in the right panels of Fig. 2 (for 
a
 
v
). 232 
 233 
2.1.2. Deterministic dynamics after the cessation of OPV 234 
The epidemiological dynamics for x , y  and v  after stopping OPV are 235 
 dx / dt  (
a
y 
v
v)x uxu, 236 
 dy / dt  
a
xy  (u
a
)y  y,  (7) 237 
 dv / dt  
v
xv  (u
v
)v  y, 238 
where t  is now the number of weeks after OPV is stopped (Fig. 3).  We assume that 239 
the population was in endemic equilibrium at time t  0  under a constant fraction p  240 
of newborns immunized by OPV.  As before, if we can assume that the transmission 241 
rates and recovery rates of attenuated and virulent polio strains are the same: 242   
a
 
v
 and   
a
 
v
, the dynamics can be described by only two variables: x  243 
and w  y  v , 244 
 dx / dt  xwuxu,  (8a) 245 
 dw / dt  xw (u )w. (8b) 246 
The susceptible density increases with time, while the densities of attenuated or 247 
virulent virus infected hosts decrease with time as long as t  t
c
, where t
c
 is the time 248 
at which the susceptible density hits the epidemiological threshold: x(t
c
)  (u ) /   249 
(see Fig. 3). The poliovirus infected density then starts increasing again. The question 250 
we ask in the following is whether the poliovirus goes to extinction around the time 251 
t  t
c
 where its density approaches the minimum. In the following we derive the 252 
global eradication probability of poliovirus by analyzing the stochastic analog of 253 
dynamics (7) for 
a
 
v
 or 
a
 
v
, and that of the dynamics (8) for the special case 254 
of 
a
 
v
 and 
a
 
v
. 255 
 256 
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2.2. Probability of successful eradication 257 
We then examine the probability of poliovirus eventually being lost from a population 258 
without causing an outbreak. To calculate extinction probabilities, we consider 259 
discrete time dynamics corresponding to (8) with weeks as time units. We assume that 260 
the number of secondary infections from a virulent-virus-infected host per week 261 
follows the Poisson distribution with mean Kx(t) , where K  is the total population 262 
size. The probability that the progeny of a virulent virus strain found in an infected 263 
host at time t  eventually goes to extinction by chance before causing an outbreak is 264 
defined as q(t). We also define 1 q(t)  as the marginal risk of outbreak at time t , 265 
which is the probability that an infected host present at time t  harbors the viruses 266 
whose progeny will cause outbreaks in the future. If 
a
 
v
   and 
a
 
v
  , the 267 
extinction probability q(t) then satisfies the recursive equation 268 
 
q(t)  (1)q(t 1) exp Kx(t)(1 q(t 1)) ,  (9) 269 
where   u  (see Appendix 1 for the derivation). The extinction probability q(t) 270 
for arbitrary time t  can be determined by solving (9), with x(t)  obtained from (5) 271 
and (8). The boundary condition for the recursion (9) is chosen at the time at which 272 
the fraction x  of susceptibles first approaches a local maximum x
e
 at t  t
e
 ( x
e
 and 273 
t
e
 always exist because the deterministic trajectory of (8) approaches an endemic 274 
equilibrium with damped oscillations - see Fig. 3): 275 
 
q
e
 (1)q
e
 exp Kxe (1 qe ) ,  (10) 276 
where q
e
 q(t
e
) is the extinction probability at t  t
e
. 277 
 278 
The probability of eventual eradication can then be calculated as follows. We choose 279 
a reference time point t  t
s
 before the deterministic trajectory for w  reaches its 280 
minimum (see Fig. 3), at which the number of infected hosts Kw
s
 Kw(t
s
)  was large 281 
enough so that eradication before that time point could be ignored, but small enough 282 
so that competition between different viral lines could be ignored. According to 283 
extensive Monte Carlo simulations we found that the stochastic loss of the infecteds 284 
may occur only after their expected number falls below 100 or less. Noting this and 285 
the fact that the competition between viral strains can be ignored when Kw
s
/ K 1, 286 
we chose Kw
s
100. The probability of eventual extinction is then  287 
 P
ext
 q(t
s
)Kws , (11) 288 
i.e. poliovirus eventually goes to extinction without causing outbreaks if and only if 289 
all progenies of the viruses present at t  t
s
 go to extinction. Note that if the total 290 
population is subdivided into mutually isolated communities (e.g., 100 cities each 291 
with one million population), then the probability that none of the cities experiences 292 
the outbreak is given by (11) with K 100one million .  293 
 294 
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We conducted extensive Monte Carlo simulations of the fully stochastic process to 295 
check the accuracy of formula (11). For the Monte Carlo simulations, week by week 296 
changes in numbers of susceptibles, attenuated virus infecteds, and virulent virus 297 
infecteds in population of size K  were followed. The changes between weeks caused 298 
by infection, recovery, mutation, and host mortality were generated by binomial 299 
pseudo-random numbers with the rates given by the dynamics (7). As shown below, 300 
the formula (11) for the probability of eventual eradication agreed quite well with that 301 
observed in the Monte Carlo simulations for 1000 independent runs. 302 
 303 
2.3. Epidemiological parameters 304 
The probability of global eradication depends on epidemiological, host demographic, 305 
and genetic parameters. Thus, estimates of the recovery rate  , the transmission rate 306  , and the mutation rate   are critical. All parameters used in the model were scaled 307 
in units of weeks. 308 
 309 
2.3.1. Recovery rate  , or the reciprocal of the mean excretion period. 310 
The mean excretion duration after challenge with 6 logs of Sabin type 1 virus has 311 
been estimated to be 20.4 days for hosts not previously immunized, 12.3 days for 312 
previously IPV-immunized hosts, and 4.6 days for previously OPV-immunized hosts 313 
(Fine and Carneiro, 1999). Thus, the mean infectious period of a type 1 primary 314 
infection is about 3 weeks. While type 2 poliovirus showed a similar excretion period 315 
to type 1, type 3 has a significantly longer excretion period (Vaccine Administration 316 
Subcommittee. The Japan Live Poliovaccine Research Commission, 1966). Mean 317 
excretion periods are estimated as 20.5, 20.6, and 38.6 days for types 1, 2 and 3, 318 
respectively, for TOPV (trivalent oral polio vaccination) (Gelfand et al., 1959). 319 
Regarding the risk of reemergence, type 3 poliovirus would be the most likely agent 320 
to persist and circulate longest after stopping OPV, and hence cause outbreaks. 321 
Therefore we adopted the excretion period for type 3 in assessing outbreak risk. Thus, 322 
we varied the recovery rate around 
a
 0.18 per week, corresponding to 5.5 weeks as 323 
the mean excretion period. Because of the similarity between the recovery rates for 324 
attenuated ( 
a
) and virulent ( 
v
) polio infections, we also assumed 
v
 0.18 . A 325 
constant recovery rate assumed here implies that the infectious period has the long tail 326 
in an exponential distribution. The effect of tail in the infectious period will be 327 
examined later.  328 
 329 
2.3.2. Transmission rate  , or the mean number of secondary infections.  330 
While the probability of within-family infection was estimated to be 0.5 per case 331 
(Benyesh- Melnick et al., 1967), we also needed to evaluate the mean transmission 332 
rate to other members of the community. The mean transmission rate was estimated 333 
from the basic reproductive rate: R0   / (u )   /  . The basic reproductive ratio 334 
of wild polioviruses in England and Wales during the pre-vaccination period has been 335 
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estimated to be R0 1012 (Anderson and May, 1991). More recent estimates have 336 
been R0 1015 in countries with poor sanitation and hygiene, and R0 less than 10 337 
in countries with good sanitation and hygiene (Fine and Carneiro, 1999). If we 338 
assume   0.18 , this gives estimates of  1.8 2.7  per week in developing 339 
countries. Much higher R0 's of more than 20 have been reported by studies of 340 
poliomyelitis outbreaks over the past 20 years (Patriarca et al., 1997). Because of this 341 
large variance in the estimated  , we varied the value rather widely, from 2 to 6, to 342 
evaluate eradication probability. 343 
 344 
2.3.3. Mutation rate   from the attenuated to the virulent virus 345 
It is known that virulent mutants appear after replication in the human gut. Such 346 
virulent strains have caused outbreaks in populations with low OPV coverage in Haiti, 347 
the Dominican Republic and Egypt (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 348 
2000, 2001). Dunn et al. reported that at least one viral serotype excreted from a 349 
susceptible individual immunized by OPV had mutated completely within 28 days 350 
(Dunn et al., 1990). Thus, the mutation rate from attenuated to virulent viruses 351 
appeared to be high, in the order of   0.1 per week.  352 
 353 
3. Results 354 
Before proceeding to specific parameter dependences, it should be noted that the time 355 
at which the fraction of susceptible hosts exceeds the threshold for epidemics is 356 
crucial in understanding the problem. The number of virulent-virus-infected hosts 357 
increases if the fraction of susceptible hosts is larger than the threshold x
c
 (u ) /  , 358 
which is the reciprocal of the basic reproductive rate R0   / (u ) , and decreases 359 
when x  is smaller than x
c
. During the initial period, when the fraction of OPV-360 
vaccinated individuals is large, the fraction of susceptibles is less than the threshold 361 
x
c
, so that the risk of an outbreak is negligible, even though considerable numbers of 362 
virulent mutants are being generated at each time step. The number of virus carriers 363 
decreases during the period from the cessation of OPV to time t
c
 at which the 364 
susceptible density exceeds the threshold x
c
. If the number of carriers becomes zero 365 
around t
c
, polio will be globally eradicated. However, if virus survives this 366 
‘endangered’ period around t
c
, the infected density increases again and a future 367 
outbreak becomes certain. The following formula (derived in Appendix 2) provides 368 
an approximate time t
c
 and minimum infected fraction w
c
 as a function of 369 
epidemiological parameters: 370 
 t
c
 Lp / R0 ,  ( R0 1), (12a) 371 
 Kw
c
 K D
L
exp  p2
2R0
L
D
 , ( R0 1, L  D ), (12b) 372 
where D 1/  is the mean duration of infection, L 1/ u  the life expectancy of the 373 
host, and R0   / (u )  the basic reproductive ratio. There is a high probability of 374 
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global eradication if Kwc  is sufficiently smaller than 1; whereas, there is a high risk 375 
of re-emergence if Kwc  is greater than 10. Although assessment of outbreak risk 376 
should be based on the probability of global viral extinction as discussed below, the 377 
above approximate formula gives insights into the likelihood of reemergence and 378 
parameter dependence on eradication probability.  It also gives an accurate estimate of 379 
the critical time tc  at which either global eradication occurs or an outbreak starts. 380 
 381 
3.1. Paths to extinction and paths to outbreak 382 
Figure 3 shows deterministic changes in fraction x  of susceptibles and fraction 383 
w  y v  of poliovirus carrying hosts after cessation of live vaccination. The fraction 384 
of susceptibles exceeded the epidemiological threshold xc  around time t  tc (150) 385 
weeks after live-vaccination discontinuation. When the fraction of susceptibles 386 
exceeds the epidemiological threshold, the fraction of infecteds is at its minimum. 387 
The public health objective is to make the number of infecteds zero around time t  tc . 388 
Figure 4 illustrates sample paths for the stochastic process corresponding to the 389 
deterministic trajectory in Fig. 3. In this example, 61 out of 100 independent runs led 390 
to the global eradication of poliovirus (i.e. the number of infected hosts hit the 391 
absorbing boundary at zero). However, in the remaining runs, poliovirus escaped 392 
extinction around t  tc , increased again, leading to an outbreak by a virulent strain. 393 
The probability of successful eradication is thus 61% by the parameter set used in Fig. 394 
4.  395 
 396 
3.2. Parameter dependence 397 
Figure 5 illustrates how the probability of the failure of global eradication 398 
Pfail 1Pext  depends on each parameter, which we discuss in turn below. We set the 399 
following values as ‘standards’, and varied each of the parameters to see its effect. 400 
The fraction of immunized newborns before t  0 : p  0.7 ; transmission rate of 401 
virulent virus: v  3.7 , that of attenuated virus: either a  v  or a  v / 2 ; 402 
recovery rate:   0.18  (in both viruses); mutation rate from attenuated to virulent 403 
viruses:   0.1; natural host mortality: u  0.00025  (all measured in units of weeks), 404 
and total population: K 100  million.  With the chosen values of  , u , and  , the 405 
basic reproductive rate of polioviruses was R0  20 . In Fig. 5, lines indicate the 406 
eradication probability calculated from Eqs. (8)-(11) for a  v , the dots indicate the 407 
observed eradication probability for 1000 independent runs of the stochastic process 408 
corresponding to the deterministic model (7) for a  v , and the crosses indicate that 409 
for a  v / 2 . We first discuss the results for a  v  in 3.2.1-3.2.5 below, and 410 
discuss the effect of a lower transmission rate of attenuated virus in 3.2.6. 411 
 412 
3.2.1. The immunization fraction p  before stopping OPV 413 
The effect of fraction p  of OPV-immunized newborns before stopping the live-414 
vaccination is illustrated in Fig. 5(A). While the probability of failing eradication is 415 
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low when p  is sufficiently high, it rises drastically around p  0.7  when p  is 416 
decreased. For example, if the immunization fraction is 60% or less before OPV is 417 
stopped, future outbreak by virulent poliovirus is almost certain. There are two 418 
reasons why a lower p  before stopping OPV enhances the risk of future outbreaks: 419 
First, it shortens the time for the susceptible host density to reach the epidemiological 420 
threshold, and second, it increases the initial infected density w0 , thereby keeping the 421 
minimum density from extinction. 422 
 423 
3.2.2. The recovery rate   424 
The success of global eradication greatly depends on the recovery rate, or its 425 
reciprocal, the mean infectious period (Fig. 5(B)). The higher the recovery rate, the 426 
more rapidly the number of poliovirus carriers decreases after supply by OPV is 427 
stopped. It is then possible to make the expected number of infecteds negligibly small 428 
when the susceptible fraction exceeds the epidemiological threshold. Conversely, by 429 
having a longer infectious period (a lower recovery rate), viruses safely persist over 430 
the endangered period around t  tc . In examples shown in Fig. 5(B), infectious 431 
periods of 7 weeks or longer are disastrous for eradication. In reality, the infectious 432 
period varies between hosts, such that in hosts with innate immunodeficiency the 433 
infectious period can be typically longer than 1 year (Hara et al., 1981; Kew et al., 434 
1998). Even a tiny fraction of such hosts significantly increases the risk of virulent 435 
virus outbreaks, as we show later.  436 
 437 
3.2.3. The transmission rate  438 
The effect of increasing the transmission rate (Fig. 5(C)) is parallel to decreasing the 439 
recovery rate described above, and both can be regarded as having the effect of 440 
increasing R0 . However, decreasing the recovery rate affects eradication probability 441 
more sensitively than increasing the transmission rate, as the former contributes to 442 
slowing the decay rate for the number of virus carriers as well as increasing R0  (see 443 
also Eq. 12).  444 
 445 
3.2.4. The mutation rate   from the attenuated to virulent viruses 446 
The eradication probability is insensitive to the mutation rate from attenuated to 447 
virulent viruses (Fig. 5(D)). If viruses persist during the period around t  tc , it does 448 
not matter which type survived as eventually the virulent virus increases its relative 449 
frequency in the viral population (if v  a). Quite different results follow when the 450 
attenuated virus has a lower transmission rate than the virulent virus (the crosses), 451 
where the probability of failing eradication is maximized for an intermediate mutation 452 
rate. 453 
 454 
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3.2.5. The total population size K  455 
This has an obvious dependence on the risk of outbreaks. The larger the population 456 
size, the larger the probability that viruses are not lost during the endangered period, 457 
and hence, the larger the risk of outbreaks. In the example shown in Fig. 5(E), a 458 
population of 10 million individuals has a more than 90% of chance for successful 459 
eradication, but communities of 100 and 1000 million have only 50% and less than 460 
5% chances, respectively, using the same epidemiological parameters. 461 
 462 
3.2.6. The transmission rate a  of attenuated virus smaller than that v  of 463 
virulent virus 464 
In each panel of Fig. 5, the probability of failing global eradication when the 465 
transmission rate a  of attenuated virus is half of that of virulent virus v  is plotted 466 
as the cross-hatches. In all cases except for the dependence of mutation rate, a lower 467 
transmission rate of attenuated viruses increases the risk of virulent virus outbreak 468 
after the cessation of OPV. This rather counter-intuitive results follow from the fact 469 
that silent circulation of attenuated viruses under live vaccination helps increasing the 470 
efficiency of immunization, as we have seen in the comparison between the threshold 471 
immunization fractions with and without silent circulation (see (2)), and the 472 
equilibrium densities for a  v  (left panels of Fig. 2) and for a  v  (right panels). 473 
Decreasing the transmission rate of attenuated virus increases the density of 474 
susceptibles in the equilibrium population under vaccination, thus shortening the time 475 
until the susceptible density hits the epidemiological threshold after the cessation of 476 
OPV (compare Fig. 2(C) with 2(D)).  477 
 478 
3.3. Tail of infectious period 479 
A constant recovery rate assumed in the previous sections implies that the infectious 480 
period is exponentially distributed. One may suspect that an outbreak of vaccine-481 
derived viruses a few years after the cessation of OPV might be the artefact caused by 482 
this long tail in the infectious period. We found, however, that the long tail in the 483 
infectious period is not necessary for this to happen --- it is  the silent circulation of 484 
avirulent polio viruses in the population, commonly observed in nature and occurring 485 
in our model as well, that is responsible for the outbreak that occurs long after the 486 
cessation of OPV. To show this, we conducted numerical simulations in which we 487 
assume that the host recovers exactly 4 weeks after the infection, i.e. the distribution 488 
of infectious period has no tail at all. The infected hosts nevertheless persist in the 489 
population far longer than 4 weeks (the infectious period  of an individual) after 490 
stopping OPV, which allows the outbreak of vaccine derived strain to occur a few 491 
years after the cessation (Fig. 6).  492 
 493 
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3.4. Marginal risk of outbreak 494 
Figure 7 illustrates change over time in the marginal risk of viruses found at time t . 495 
Marginal risk is defined as 1 q(t)  -- the probability that an infected host present at 496 
time t  harbors viruses whose progeny will cause a future outbreak. Marginal risk is 497 
negligibly small just after t  0 , and rapidly increases with t  near t  tc . In the 498 
parameters used in Fig. 7, the rate of increase in probability is the highest around 499 
t 150  when the susceptible host density exceeds the threshold (see Fig. 3). However, 500 
the marginal risk of viruses before this point is by no means negligible as there is 501 
notable probability that progenies of viruses found during t 100  to 150 would later 502 
cause an outbreak. 503 
 504 
3.5. Effect of a high risk group 505 
We here examine the case where a small fraction r  of hosts has a recovery rate,  , 506 
much lower than   for other hosts. In the simulation shown in Fig. 8, the recovery 507 
rate of most individuals was   0.2 . Using this value, successful eradication is 508 
certain (other parameters: transmission rate,   2.5; natural mortality, u  0.00025 ; 509 
immunization fraction before stopping OPV, p  0.7 ; total population, K 100  510 
million). When we assume only 0.01% of newborns have a 10-times longer infectious 511 
period than other members, i.e.,   0.1 , due to innate (World Health Organization, 512 
1989; Fine and Carneiro, 1999), or acquired immunodeficiency, the probability of 513 
failure in global eradication rises to 79% (Fig. 8). Thus even a tiny fraction of high 514 
risk group drastically makes the global eradication difficult. 515 
 516 
 517 
3.6. Effectiveness of IPV 518 
What if extensive IPV-immunization follows the cessation of OPV? We assume in 519 
this case that all newborns are immunized by inactive vaccine before eventual 520 
eradication. The probability of global eradication is then evaluated in the light of the 521 
results obtained so far by replacing the transmission rates and recovery rates with 522 
values for previously IPV-immunized hosts instead of the values for susceptible hosts. 523 
IPV cannot prevent infection by either attenuated or virulent viruses, although it can 524 
reduce disease severity, and fewer viruses are excreted from IPV immunized hosts 525 
than from unvaccinated hosts (Henry et al., 1966). IPV vaccination would therefore 526 
reduce the transmission rate and increase the global eradication probability (see Fig. 527 
5(C)). Also, IPV immunization reduces the infectious period, again increasing the 528 
probability of successful eradication (Fig. 5(B)). However, these considerations 529 
assume that all hosts are IPV-immunized after the cessation of OPV.  The actual 530 
amount of risk reduction by IPV depends on coverage, vaccine efficiency, and host 531 
heterogeneity in the excretion period. 532 
 533 
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4. Discussion 534 
The PAHO and WPRO (Regional Office for the Western Pacific) declared the 535 
eradication of poliomyelitis in 1994 and 2000, respectively. Nevertheless, an outbreak 536 
of poliomyelitis caused by a type 1 vaccine-derived strain was reported in Haiti and 537 
the Dominican Republic in 2000 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2000), 538 
and an outbreak by a type 2 vaccine-derived strain has been reported in Egypt 539 
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2001), in Nigeria (Wassilak S et 540 
al.,2011). It is assumed that both cases were due to the low rate of vaccine coverage. 541 
Although OPV or IPV immunization have been effective in controlling the 542 
transmission of wild-type strains, cases of re-emergence by wild-type strains have 543 
been reported in several countries (Patriarca et al., 1997) in which inadequate vaccine 544 
potency or a high rate of unimmunized individuals led to low herd immunity in the 545 
population. 546 
 547 
According to a review by Patriarca et al., rates of seroconversion by OPV approached 548 
100% for each serotype in industrialized countries, but were approximately 70% for 549 
types 1 and 3 in developing countries (Patriarca et al., 1991). Many studies have 550 
demonstrated that interference by enteroviruses in human gut and other factors in 551 
OPV administration affect the seroconversion rate (Triki et al., 1997). Thus, even if 552 
OPV coverage is as high as 90%, the immunized fraction p  in our model becomes 553 
62%, under the 70% seroconversion rate observed in developing countries. This 554 
should invoke serious concern if we recall that the reduction in immunization fraction 555 
p  before cessation of OPV drastically increases the risk of outbreak, as shown in Fig. 556 
5(A). 557 
 558 
Our results have specifically shown that a herd immunity level of less than 60% 559 
before the cessation of OPV led to the failure of poliovirus eradication under typical 560 
epidemiological parameters adopted in this paper. This suggests that maintaining 561 
more than 90% OPV coverage is not enough to ensure successful eradication, and that 562 
every effort should be made to increase the seroconversion rate in developing 563 
countries. Another important parameter affecting the probability of eradication is the 564 
recovery rate   estimated from the mean infectious period. Most data concerning 565 
virus excretion rates available from field studies were for the type 1 vaccine strain 566 
(Alexander et al., 1997), while much less information is available for types 2 and 3. 567 
As type 2 and particularly type 3 have longer excretion periods than type 1, these 568 
strains are more likely to persist after cessation of OPV and be the causative agents of 569 
outbreaks. In assessing risk, we varied the recovery rate in the range   0.1 0.25 , 570 
based on estimates for the excretion period of type 3 poliovirus, which appears to 571 
have the longest excretion period. Whether this overestimates the risk will eventually 572 
be settled by more accurate estimations of excretion periods.  However, there may not 573 
be enough time to allow the necessary studies, and action may need to taken now 574 
assuming the worst possible scenario. 575 
 576 
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We have shown that even when the mean infectious period is far below the fatal level 577 
for eradication failure (e.g. less than 7 weeks in the example shown in Fig. 5(B)), the 578 
presence of a tiny fraction of immunodeficient individuals greatly increases the risk of 579 
disease reemergence. This was because the primary immunodeficient group acts as a 580 
long-term viral reservoir, allowing the virus to persist through the endangered period 581 
around tc  (which comes typically 150-200 weeks after the cessation of OPV). At 582 
present, no evidence exists whether secondary immunodeficient groups, such as HIV 583 
infected patients, could act as a long-term reservoir of poliovirus, but it is possible. 584 
Monitoring virus excretion from such high-risk groups would become critically 585 
important.  586 
 587 
Another factor that drastically increases the risk of polio outbreak after the cessation 588 
of OPV is lower transmission rate a  of attenuated viruses than that v  of vaccine-589 
derived virulent viruses, as we have shown in Fig. 5 where the results for a  v / 2  590 
is compared with the case a  v . If we further reduces the transmission rate of 591 
attenuated viruses to a  v / 4 , the risk of outbreak rises up still more (not shown). 592 
This rather unexpected and hazardous dependency comes from the fact that silent 593 
circulation of attenuated viruses under vaccination is beneficial in increasing the 594 
efficiency of herd immunity. The more is the transmission rate of attenuated viruses, 595 
the less is the fraction of hosts that remain susceptible under a fixed vaccination rate. 596 
Reducing the transmission rate of attenuated viruses thus increases the susceptible 597 
density under vaccination, and hence shortens the time until the susceptible density 598 
hits the epidemiological threshold after the cessation of OPV. 599 
 600 
Transmission rates ( ) can be estimated from R0 , which in turn have been estimated 601 
from the mean host age at infection (Anderson and May, 1982; Patriarca et al., 1997; 602 
Fine and Carneiro, 1999). Such surveys indicate that R0  of vaccine-derived poliovirus 603 
lies in the range 5-25, depending on the hygiene levels of the region.  This is well 604 
above the threshold R0 1 that allows circulation in susceptible hosts. Eradication 605 
probability can be increased by reducing the transmission rate, i.e., by preventing 606 
vaccine-derived viruses from circulating in the population as much as possible. Public 607 
health attempts to reduce contact with infectious individuals becomes important in 608 
reducing the transmission rate  . At the same time, monitoring the circulation of 609 
shed virus in the healthy human population and environment becomes even more 610 
important after the last round of OPV.  611 
 612 
Many studies have shown that immunity by IPV cannot prevent re-infection by 613 
poliovirus (Murdin et al., 1996). However, IPV immunization reduces mean excretion 614 
duration by 40% compared to unimmunized cases, thus increasing the recovery rate   615 
by 67% (Henry et al., 1966). IPV also reduces the transmission rate because the 616 
number of excreted viruses per unit time also declines. As a result of the increased   617 
and decreased  , the probability of eradication is higher if IPV immunization follows 618 
the cessation of OPV than if no program follows it. Although eradication cannot be 619 
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achieved without OPV, IPV should be considered, together with its high 620 
seroconversion rate, as the primary follow-up strategy after OPV cessation to prevent 621 
the secondary transmission of vaccine-derived virus (Ghendon and Robertson, 1994; 622 
Sutter et al., 2000). 623 
 624 
Neither escape-mutation by antigenic drift (Nowak and May, 1991; Nowak et al., 625 
1991; Sasaki, 1994; Haraguchi and Sasaki, 1997;  Sasaki and Haraguchi, 2000) nor 626 
the emergence of vaccine-resistant strains (Anderson and May, 1991; McLean, 1995) 627 
is considered in this paper, though, in our analysis of IPV-immunization, both 628 
attenuated and virulent viruses can be regarded as IPV-resistant strains. The presence 629 
of multiple serotypes in the viral population complicates the eradication strategy 630 
(Lipsitch, 1997). The reason we have ignored such factors in this model of polio 631 
eradication is the observation that nucleotide divergence within the VP1 region, 632 
which includes the antigenic site, is less than 1.4% in vaccine strains, enabling the 633 
protection by OPV or IPV immunization (Matsuura et al., 2000). In a study using a 634 
monoclonal antibody towards a vaccine strain, substitutions in the VP1 region did 635 
affect neutralization (Wiegers et al., 1989). However, these vaccine-derived strains 636 
could still be neutralized by polyclonal antiserum (Matsuura et al., 2000),or be 637 
prevented under well-maintained herd immunity (Iwai et al., 2008). 638 
 639 
Our model suggests that susceptible host density exceeds the threshold around the 640 
time tc  Lp / R0  after the cessation of OPV (e.g., tc 140  weeks when life 641 
expectancy L 1/ u  4000  weeks, immunization fraction p  0.7  and basic 642 
reproductive ratio R0  20 ). During the dangerous period around tc , additional 643 
surveillance systems other than normal AFP (acute flaccid paralysis) surveillance 644 
should be organized to reduce the risk of reemergence: 645 
1. Seroepidemiological surveillance of the seroconversion rate within a population. 646 
For communities with low seroconversion rates, additional immunization by IPV 647 
should be offered. Herd immunity should be maintained at a level over 80% 648 
seroconversion. 649 
2. Surveillance of the environment and of shed virus from the source of infection. 650 
Upon poliovirus isolation, immunization by IPV is to be administrated to the risk 651 
area. 652 
3. Public health administration. A hygiene control program (hand washing practice, 653 
use of disposal diapers, etc.) would contribute to the reduction in transmission 654 
rate  , preventing the virus from circulating. 655 
4. Monitoring of high-risk groups such as immunodeficient individuals. 656 
It is very difficult to use IPV globally due to economic reasons and other 657 
administrative difficulties. IPV immunization in restricted regions and in at-risk 658 
communities, together with good surveillance systems and hygiene control programs, 659 
would be more practical tactics to globally extinguish vaccine-derived viruses. 660 
 661 
662 
 18
Appendix 1: Derivation of Eq. (9) 663 
Here we derive Eq. (9) in the text. This is derived by noting that there may be i  664 
infected hosts in the next time step either if an infected host gives rise to i1 665 
secondary infections and itself remains infected, or if it gives rise to i  secondary 666 
infections and itself dies or recovers. Thus 667 
 q(t) (1) (t)i1(i1)!i1 e (t )q(t 1)i  (t)ii!i0 e (t )q(t 1)i  668 
  (1)q(t 1) e (t )(1q(t1)) (t)q(t 1)  jj!j0 e (t )q(t1)  669 
  (1)q(t 1) e (t )(1q(t1))  (A1) 670 
with (t)  Kx(t) , which then leads to (9) in the text. 671 
 672 
Appendix 2: Approximate time and number of infecteds at the minimum point 673 
It is useful to obtain an explicit formula for the minimum number of infecteds and the 674 
time at which this number reaches its minimum in the deterministic trajectory.  This 675 
clarifies the parameter dependence on the risk of re-emergence. We found the 676 
following approximation useful. We ignore the first term in the right hand of (8a), 677 
because it remains very small during the time interval from t  0  to t  tc , to give 678 
  x(t) 1 (1 x0 )eut  , (A2) 679 
(see, for example, Anderson and May, 1991). Integrating (8b) we have 680 
 w(t)  w0 exp x(s) (u ) ds0t . (A3) 681 
Clearly w(t)  attains the local minimum when t  tc  where x(t)  u . Letting 682 
 a    (u )
u
 k(R0 1),     b  (1 x0 )
u
 kR0 (1 x0 ),  (A4) 683 
with k  (u ) / u  and R0   / (u ) , we therefore have 684 
 tc  1
u
log b
a
  L log R0 (1 x0 )R0 1 ,  (A5a) 685 
 wc  w0 b
a
 a eab  w0 R0 (1 x0 )R0 1 
k (R01)
exp R0x0 1 ,  (A5b) 686 
where L 1/ u  is the life expectancy, and R0   / (u )  the basic reproductive rate. 687 
We expect a high probability of eradication if Kwc   is sufficiently smaller than 1, and 688 
show significant risk of re-emergence if it is 10 or more. The deviation of wc   from 689 
the true minimum is small in logarithmic scale, though it is as large as 50% in normal 690 
scale. However, for the purpose of quickly checking the likelihood of successful 691 
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eradication, this formula is useful. If we assume that x0  and w0  take the values at the 692 
endemic equilibrium with the vaccination rate p  (Eq. (5) in the text), we obtain the 693 
asymptotic formula for large R0 : 694 
 tc  Lp / R0,  ( R0 1), (A6a) 695 
 Kwc  K DL exp  p22R0 LD ,  ( R0 1, L  D ), (A6b) 696 
where D 1/  is the mean duration of infection. 697 
698 
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Figure Legend 844 
Figure 1. The schematic diagram of the epidemiological dynamics. a  and v : the 845 
transmission rate of attenuated and virulent virus, a  and  v : the recovery rate of 846 
attenuated and virulent virus,  : the mutation rate from attenuated to virulent virus, 847 
u : the host birth rate (= death rate), p : the fraction of newborns immunized by OPV. 848 
The flows by natural host mortality are omitted. 849 
 850 
Figure 2. The densities in endemic equilibrium under the immunization fraction 851 
p . The number, Kv xˆvˆ  of hosts newly infected by virulent virus in a week  (top row), 852 
the equilibrium number Kxˆ  of susceptible hosts (second row), that Kyˆ of attenuated 853 
virus infected hosts (third row), and that Kvˆ  of virulent virus infected hosts (bottom 854 
row) are plotted as a function of immunization fraction p  for varying mutation rates 855   for the emergence of virulent virus from an attenuated virus (sold:   0.1, dashed: 856   0.01 , dot dashed:   0.001). The population size K  is 100 million, v  2.5  is 857 
the transmission rate of virulent virus. Left panels (A, B, E, G): The transmission rate 858 
of attenuated virus is half of that of virulent virus: a 1.25. Right panels (B, D, F, 859 
H) a  is the same as v . Other parameters are a   v  0.25, u  0.00025 . 860 
 861 
Figure 3. Deterministic trajectory after stopping OPV. Deterministic trajectory of 862 
epidemiological dynamics (8) in the text. The fraction x(t)  of susceptibles (upper 863 
panel) and the fraction w(t)  of infecteds (lower panel) are plotted as functions of the 864 
time t  0  since the cessation of OPV. The dotted line indicates the threshold host 865 
density for outbreak: xc  (u ) /  . The initial fractions x0  and w0  at time t  0 are 866 
assumed to be in endemic equilibrium under OPV immunization to a constant fraction, 867 
p , of newborns. The time t  tc  at which the fraction of infecteds is minimized in 868 
deterministic trajectory is indicated, together with time t  ts and t  te defined for the 869 
calculation of the global eradication probability (Eq. (11)). Parameters are: p  0.7, 870   3.7,   0.18, u  0.00025 . 871 
 872 
Figure 4. Sample paths for the number of infecteds observed in Monte Carlo 873 
simulations. Sample paths for the number of infecteds observed in Monte Carlo 874 
simulations of the stochastic process corresponding to dynamics (7). One hundred 875 
independent runs are illustrated by thin lines. Thick broken lines indicate the 876 
deterministic trajectory. The histogram shows the distribution for  the times at which 877 
viruses went to extinction. 38 out of 100 runs never go to extinction, and cause 878 
outbreaks. The parameters are the same as in Fig. 3, and K 108 .  879 
 880 
Figure 5. The probability of the failure of global eradication as a function of 881 
epidemiological and genetic parameters. Each panel shows how the probability of 882 
failing the global eradication Pfail 1Pext   (where Pext  is defined in Eq. 11) depends 883 
on a chosen parameter. Except for the varying parameter in each panel, the parameters 884 
are fixed as p  0.7 ,   3.7 ( v  a   for dots and lines, and v   , a   / 2 885 
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for cross-hatched),    v  a  0.18 , m  0.1 , K 108 , and u  0.00025 . Varying 886 
parameters are: A) fraction p  of OPV-immunization before its cessation, B) recovery 887 
rate  , C) transmission rate  , d) mutation rate  , e) total population size K . Lines: 888 
the  probability of failure obtained from formula (11) in the text (for v  a   ), 889 
dots: the proportion of failing eradications in 1000 independent runs of the Monte 890 
Carlo simulation for v  a   , and cross-hatched: that for v   , a   / 2. 891 
 892 
Figure 6. The effect of tail in the infectious period. A) The probability that the host 893 
remains infectious after it is infected at time 0. Dotted curve: the exponential 894 
distribution assumed in the previous sections with a constant recovery rate   0.25 895 
per week. Solid curve: the truncated distribution in which all the hosts recovers 896 
exactly 4 weeks after the infection. B) The Monte Carlo simulation results assuming 897 
the truncated distribution of the infectious period. The time change in the number of 898 
virus-infected hosts since OPV is stopped. The emergence of virulent virus occurs 899 
after 50-60 weeks after the secession of OPV. The parameters are a  2.5 , v  5, 900 
u  0.00025 , p  0.6,   0.1, and K 108 . The 'mean' infectious period is 4 weeks.  901 
 902 
Figure 7. Marginal risk 1 q(t)  of outbreaks as a function of time t  since OPV 903 
cessation. The marginal risk 1 q(t)  is defined as the probability that an infected host 904 
present at time t  harbors viruses whose progeny will cause outbreaks in the future. 905 
p  0.7,   3.7,   0.18, u  0.00025 , K 108 . 906 
 907 
Figure 8. The effect of a high-risk group on global eradication. One in ten 908 
thousand (0.01%) of hosts are assumed to be born having a longer excretion period 909 
(lower recovery rate   ) when infected by virus. Remaining hosts have the recovery 910 
rate  .   0.1  and   0.2  is assumed and values p  0.7 ,   2.5 ,   0.1 , 911 
u  0.00025 , K 108 $ are used for other parameters.  Without the high-risk group, i.e. 912 
when all hosts have the recovery rate   0.2 , global eradication is certain. However, 913 
with the addition of a fraction 0.01% of high-risk group in the population, eradication 914 
fails in 79 out of 100 independent runs, allowing the outbreak of virulent virus. A) 915 
Sample paths for the number of infecteds for 100 independent runs. Thick broken 916 
lines show the deterministic trajectory. B) Deterministic trajectories for the fraction of 917 
infected w(t)  when all hosts have the recovery rate   (broken line), and when 0.01% 918 
of hosts have lower recovery rate   (solid line). 919 
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